Syria’s problems are more than ‘sectarian’ – only a true national dialogue will address them

The World Today, Chatham House

Rime Allaf, September 15, 2025

Reductive descriptions of recent violence and flawed elections distract from President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s shortcomings in delivering the democracy that Syria’s complex society demands, writes Rime Allaf.

A Syrian woman holds up a sign in Arabic that reads ‘Alawites are our brothers and family’ during a protest in Qamishli against a wave of violence. Photo: Delil Souleiman/ AFP via Getty Images.

The euphoria that Syrians felt after Bashar al-Assad’s hurried flight from the country in December 2024 came laden with expectations that a better future would quickly follow the collapse of his violent regime. Most understood, however, that this would partly depend on international recognition of the new Islamist authorities.

Reassuring signs came swiftly. Officials from major powers rushed to Damascus to meet Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s new leader, and launched fresh diplomatic and economic ties. In May, President Donald Trump announced the lifting of US sanctions that had stifled the Syrian economy for decades.

But as Sharaa prepares to address the UN General Assembly later this month – the first Syrian head of state to do so in six decades – encouraging developments abroad contrast starkly with increasingly serious problems at home. Many expectations remain unfulfilled in a tense and divided society, from reining in undisciplined security forces, to initiating transitional justice and building a participatory political process. These failings are laid bare in this month’s parliamentary election. For those who anticipated a new era of political pluralism after 50 years of waiting, is Syria heading in the wrong direction?

Firm control 

After overthrowing the Assad regime in December, Sharaa’s group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, appointed him president in January and announced its dissolution. The following month, the new authorities hastily convened a national dialogue conference in Damascus, involving one thousand delegates, although the selection criteria were never disclosed. It concluded after just one day with a pre-drafted statement setting out Syria’s path for the next five years, which would culminate in a permanent constitution and yet-to-be-defined presidential elections.

The statement also introduced a constitutional declaration that decreed Islam as the main source of legislation and gave Sharaa sweeping executive, legislative and judicial authority. This included the power to directly appoint not only one third of the members of the forthcoming parliament, but to form the committees that would choose the remaining two thirds of the candidates. 

These selections are due to take place by September 20, although most Syrians struggle to see how this will result in a people’s assembly. The desire for representative governance is strong. In a recent survey, almost two thirds of Syrians said they believed that a democratic system was best for the country. However, by not appointing a prime minister and with a government that he has tailored mostly to fit his own ideological leanings, Sharaa has, in effect, become the law himself.

Violent confrontations

Despite this, support for Sharaa remained relatively widespread during his first few weeks in Damascus. This changed in March when government security forces were attacked by Assad loyalists in the coastal town of Jableh, leading to violent reprisals and massacres of Alawite civilians over the following days. Sharaa’s general amnesty – declared promptly after taking power to encourage former soldiers to surrender their weapons –had worked with the lower ranks, but senior officers who had stayed in hiding, fearing war crimes trials, spearheaded the rebellion.

Four months later, a similar pattern unfolded in the southern region of Suweida. After entering the city to intervene between Druze and Bedouin armed groups, government security forces were attacked by Druze militia and Israeli airstrikes. Still claiming they were acting to protect the Druze, the Israelis then bombed the Ministry of Defence in central Damascus. As they had in March, government forces responded violently to these attacks, targeting Druze civilians as well as militias. In both of these confrontations, it was clear that state forces committed numerous crimes and that several armed groups continue to claim a stake in their respective regions in defiance of the state.

Sectarian labels don’t help

These events and the ensuing social discord shocked many Syrians, even those willing to give the new authorities a chance. Amid this shock, however, a concerning pattern has emerged. Over the past few months, these clashes have been increasingly portrayed in purely sectarian terms by regional and foreign media, those living in affected areas and inciters outside Syria. This framing often distinguishes between the large Sunni majority – which comprises roughly 75 per cent of the population – and the smaller minority groups, including Druze, Alawites and Christians.

The media has invoked this narrative repeatedly, often headlining the clashes as ‘sectarian violence’ and describing ‘fearful minorities’ that are resisting the state’s control. Moreover, sectarian hate speech is continuing to inflame many, despite attempts by Sharaa’s government to clamp down on this incitement, including at universities. In May, a BBC Arabic investigation revealed a coordinated network of foreign-based accounts on X spreading disinformation and inciting sectarian tensions.

While the confrontations showed the need for stronger protection of civilians across the country, depicting these tensions and Syria’s wider problems as inherently sectarian carries its own substantial risks. For one, this framing – whether pitting Sunnis against Druze or other minorities – perpetuates many of the colonial era’s ethnic fault lines and the terminology of the French Mandate (1920-1946).

In Syria today, emphasizing a precarious position for minorities implies that there is a threatening, Damascus-led Sunni majority. But this oversimplification is damaging. Even the idea that Sunni Syrians constitute a monolithic grouping is inaccurate, let alone the suggestion that they uniformly agree with the agenda of Sharaa’s government. Nor do the new authorities necessarily reflect the views of a majority of Syrians, particularly on the question of religion. For example, many Syrians object to the imposition of Islam as the main source of legislation. Vigorous debates on Syrian media and social networks following the national dialogue showed that even those born into the same faith do not agree on what constitutes an acceptable degree of religion in their lives. 

This complexity is reflected across the rest of Syrian society, which has long been considered one of the most diverse in the Middle East. Religious and ethnic pluralism is just one part of this picture. Other elements, including class, education and regional origins, play a much larger role in shaping people’s lives and identity than sectarian categories allow. The range of civil society initiatives launched after the events in Suweida indicates the extensive efforts to reduce sectarian divisions. 

The social landscape is further complicated by the legacy of the country’s 14-year civil war, which displaced 14 million Syrians – 60 per cent of its population – and forced between six and seven million of those to become refugees. While reliable data is scarce, the reactions of many displaced Syrians – most of whom come from the Sunni majority – suggest that divisions among this demographic have more to do with education, lifestyle and experience than with belonging to a specific sect.

Syrians, like others from pluralistic societies, have varying perspectives on governance, the role of women, family and faith in their life, and their appetite for modernisation and conserving certain traditions. Only by consolidating the idea of citizenship around these differences can Syrians begin to move past the divisions that the Assad regime spent half a century sowing.

Towards pluralism and stability

Inclusivity and pluralism must trickle down from the top and be nurtured from the ground, hence the urgent need for a true national dialogue involving every segment of society. While Syrians disagree on many issues, they are united in expecting their opinions to be heard. The only way to plan such a dialogue is through a thorough and transparent consultation process, with discussions starting at local council levels, and spreading out regionally across Syria’s 14 state governorates.

For the first time in decades, there is a consensus from regional and western states on preventing Syria from sliding back into chaos or isolation. For that to happen, they must strongly encourage a participatory process with more democratic principles, the enlargement of Sharaa’s circle of advisers, and ensure the national dialogue includes refugees, millions of whom remain abroad. They must support the accountability process and the rehabilitative training of national armed forces to ensure all Syrians are protected, as well as the promised transitional justice that has yet to begin healing this wounded society. These steps are not just a best-case scenario: they are prerequisites for the success of Syria as a cohesive modern state.

Rime Allaf, Syrian writer; Former Associate Fellow, Chatham House, is the author of It Started in Damascus: How the Long Syrian Revolution Reshaped Our World (Hurst, November 2025).